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I . STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
After the Defendant Lonnie L. Allen's probation ended in 
this case, he filed motions in the District Court requesting that 
(a) his admission to a probation violation be set aside, (b) his 
plea of guilty be set aside and the case be dismissed, and (c) 
that his case file be sealed. The District Court denied the 
motion to set aside his plea of guilty and dismiss the case. The 
District Court also denied the motion to seal the case file. 1 
This is an appeal from the District Court's denial of Mr. Allen's 
motions. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In August 2009, Mr. Allen was charged by Criminal Complaint 
with attempted strangulation and second degree kidnapping. In 
accordance with a plea bargain, Mr. Allen entered an Alford plea 
to the charge of attempted strangulation on December 10, 2009. 
The kidnapping charge was dismissed. On January 7, 2010 the 
District Court sentenced Mr. Allen. Among other things, the 
The District Court never ruled on the request that Mr. 
Allen's admission to a probation violation be set aside. 
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District Court placed Mr. Allen on supervised probation for three 
years. 
On September 9, 2010 a report of violation was filed in Mr. 
Allen's case by the Idaho Department of Correction. At a hearing 
on November 16, 2010, Mr. Allen admitted to consuming a couple of 
beers during probation. On December 21, 2010, the District Court 
imposed eight days of jail to be served on weekends. Mr. Allen 
otherwise remained on probation. 
On December 2, 2011, Mr. Allen moved the District Court to 
terminate his probation early, set aside his admission to the 
probation violation, and set aside his plea of guilty and have 
the charge dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2604. The 
District Court heard evidence and arguments from the parties on 
December 20, 2011. The State supported the placement of Mr. 
Allen on unsupervised probation at that time. The District Court 
agreed and placed Mr. Allen on unsupervised probation. Because 
probation continued, Mr. Allen vacated the hearing as to the 
other motions. 
On July 2, 2012, Mr. Allen renewed his motions to terminate 
probation, set aside the admission to a probation violation and 
for relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604. The State did not object 
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and deferred to the Court. The District Court ordered probation 
terminated as of July 2, 2012 and asked Mr. Allen to submit a 
memorandum regarding the two remaining motions. Mr. Allen filed 
the memorandum on August 6, 2012. On August 27, 2012, the 
District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: 
Defendant's Motion for Relief from Probation Violation and Motion 
for Relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604 (the August 27, 2012 
Memorandum Decision). In the August 27, 2012 Memorandum 
Decision, the District Court denied the request for relief under 
Idaho Code § 19-2604. As indicated earlier, the District Court 
did not rule on the request to set aside the admission to a 
probation violation. 
On September 10, 2012, Mr. Allen requested the District 
Court to reconsider the August 27, 2012 Memorandum Decision. At 
the same time, Mr. Allen also moved the District Court to seal 
all records in the case pursuant to Rule 32(i) of the Idaho Court 
Administrative Rules. Memoranda in support of the Motion to 
Reconsider and the Motion to Seal were filed with the District 
Court on November 2, 2012. The Court received evidence and 
argument from Mr. Allen on November 20, 2012. The State did not 
object to either request. The Court took the matter under 
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advisement and on December 12, 2012 issued a Memorandum Decision 
and Order Re: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion 
to Seal Records (the December 12, 2012 Memorandum Decision) in 
which both Motions were denied. Mr. Allen filed a Notice of 
Appeal of the December 12, 2012 Memorandum Decision on January 
23, 2013. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Allen pled guilty to attempted strangulation pursuant to 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 u.S. 25 (1970) on December 10, 
2009. R. at p. 117-129. The underlying facts which led to the 
charge in this case were highly disputed. The District Court was 
presented with different accounts of the facts of the case. The 
PSI, the police reports, and the testimony at the preliminary 
hearing in this case substantiate these different viewpoints. 
Initially, the complaining party said that she and Mr. Allen 
were verbally arguing when first approached by law enforcement. 
She did not run to the officer screaming for help, or allege that 
Mr. Allen had hit her, choked her, or strangled her. In fact, 
the complaining party actually said she was not hurt and the 
Trooper testified at the preliminary hearing that he did not 
notice any injuries on her. Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p. 
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92 L. 12. Mr. Allen was charged with driving without privileges 
at the scene, not attempted strangulation or any domestic related 
offense. 
Subsequent to the arrest, law enforcement discovered videos 
in the trunk of Mr. Allen's car. When confronted with these 
videos, the complaining witness' version of the events changed. 
Specifically, she claimed that she was grabbed under the chin and 
that Mr. Allen's hand was against her throat. After further time 
to reflect, the complaining party's version of events and 
injuries broadened, including injuries to her nose, arm, elbow, 
along with her throat, neck, and jaw. PSI and attached Police 
Report. However, at yet another time, the complaining witness 
described the entirety of the event under direct examination as 
1) involving only one hand; 2) she was able to breath; and 3) she 
did not blackout. Preliminary Hearing Transcript, at p. 47-48. 
Mr. Allen disputed these facts throughout the case, 
summarizing that based on his Alford plea that "there really are 
no facts to share. .1 should have been more upfront in my 
dating indiscretion to avoid such a reaction. 1 do feel bad, and 
wish her the best." PSI, at p. 3. 
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Mr. Allen successfully completed probation such that the 
Court agreed to an early termination of probation. R. p. 212-
213. Mr. Allen requested the District Court to set aside his 
Alford plea and ultimately dismiss the case due to his 
rehabilitation and restorative progress on probation. R. at p. 
194-195; Motion for Relief at p. 6-13; Motion to Terminate at p. 
24-27; Motion for Reconsideration at p. 39-45. The District 
Court denied the request. R. at p. 258 & 291. 
Mr. Allen requested the District Court to seal the case file 
because the privacy interests of Mr. Allen and other people 
predominated over any public interest in the case. R. at p. 261-
262, 274-278; Motion for Reconsideration at p. 39-45. The 
District Court denied the request. R. at p. 282-292. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the decision to deny Mr. Allen's Idaho Code § 19-
2604 motion due to it not being compatible with public interest 
despite his substantial compliance with probation an abuse of 
discretion? 
2. Was the decision to deny Mr. Allen's motion to seal a 
case file that contains highly intimate material about multiple 
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parties and has caused financial hardship to Mr. Allen an abuse 
of discretion? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court abused its discretion in denying 
relief under Idaho Code § 19-2604. 
The District Court failed to adequately address Mr. Allen's 
argument in support of his request for relief under Idaho Code 
§ 19-2604. This oversight shows the Court did not reach the 
decision through an exercise of reason. 
An abuse of discretion can occur in several ways. "A trial 
court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the 
issue as one of discretion, (2) acts within the boundaries of its 
discretion and applies the applicable legal standards, and (3) 
reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." State v. 
Guess, 154 Idaho 521 (2013), quoting, Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 
Idaho 423 (2008). 
The decision to grant relief pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-
2604 is a matter within the discretion of the District Court. 
Guess. The relief need not advance or promote the public 
interest; however, it may not be contrary to or inconsistent with 
the public interest. Id. Public interest refers to that which 
the public or the community at large has an interest. State v. 
Dieter, 153 Idaho 730 (2012). 
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While the Deiter decision gives no specific guidance for 
what constitutes public interest, the Court mentions the Private 
Attorney General Doctrine and how a portion of the doctrine's 
test includes "the strength or societal importance of the public 
policy indicated by the litigation," as a factor to consider. 
Id. 
The public has an interest in any criminal defendant being 
successfully rehabilitated upon sentencing. Rooted in this 
public policy is Idaho Code § 19-2604, and the potential to have 
a conviction set aside. For years, the criminal justice system 
has increased punitive measures. These measures have not reduced 
recidivism but have actually led to overgrown correctional 
facilities, hampered state and federal budgets, and a growing 
list of the public labeled as convicted criminals. The stick 
approach in the criminal justice system does not work without a 
carrot. Dismissal of a criminal charge upon successful 
completion of probation provides the carrot after the stick is 
used. 
The 2011 amendment to Idaho Code § 19-2604 was designed to 
give a defendant more of a chance to have his or her conviction 
set aside. As a consequence, it provides additional incentives 
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to abide by probation. 2 In 2011, legal counsel for the Supreme 
Court expressed to the Idaho Legislature that it provides aid for 
defendants in making them productive and contributing citizens, 
leading to an increase in employment and education opportunities. 
As Deiter suggests, utilizing the Private Attorney General 
Doctrine as guidance, it is important to society that offenders 
be rehabilitated and afforded the opportunity to be successful in 
life. Not granting Idaho Code § 19-2604 relief continues the 
convicted criminal label, decreases the ability to be successful, 
and may cause an individual to lose out on educational and 
employment opportunities. Without these opportunities, 
convicted, yet rehabilitated, defendants may be forced into 
unemployment, reliance on food stamps, or other government 
financial assistance. Placed in these strained situations, 
recidivism will likely increase. Recidivism causes increased 
strain to the criminal justice system, which in turn places 
further burden on society and the public at large with both 
public safety and financial concerns. 
In this case, the District Court declined to set aside Mr. 
Allen's conviction for one reason only: because it was not 
compatible with public interest: 
2 A further amendment was implemented on July 1, 2013 
broadening the statute further. 
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Of particular concern was the severity of Mr. Allen's 
crime of attempted strangulation and the circumstances 
surrounding it. After considering Mr. Allen's actions 
and the way he accomplished the crime, it was necessary 
to impose a sentence that serves the primary objective 
of sentencing, which is the protection of society, as 
well as the related goal of deterring the commission of 
similar violent crimes in the community by other 
potential defendants who are similarly situated. 
Although Mr. Allen may have made strides to become a 
better citizen, in the discretion of the Court, it 
appears that the severity of the crime and the method 
of its accomplishment militates against either the 
dismissal of the judgment of conviction or a reduction 
to a misdemeanor. 
R. at p. 290. 
The public's interest is best served with the granting of 
Idaho Code § 19-2604 relief in this case because Mr. Allen was 
successful during probation and should be afforded the relief to 
continue to be a benefit to society rather than facing the 
stigmatic burden of being labeled a convicted criminal, and 
facing the difficulties associated with the label. See Motion 
for Reconsideration at p. 39-45. 
The District Court's conclusion that the severity of the 
crime and the manner in which it was accomplished is sufficient 
to deny the relief sought is not justified by the record. The 
District Court was presented with two versions of events on the 
night of August 12, 2009. The PSI, the police reports, and the 
testimony at the preliminary hearing in this case substantiate 
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these different versions of what happened. However, the District 
Court failed to acknowledge that the versions of the events only 
became different at the point where the complaining party was 
confronted with evidence that Mr. Allen had been sexually active 
with other women at the same time he was in his relationship with 
her. 
It is important to note that initially, the complaining 
party said that she and Mr. Allen were verbally arguing when 
approached by law enforcement on the highway. She did not run to 
the officer screaming for help, or allege that Mr. Allen had hit 
her, choked her, or strangled her. In fact, the complaining 
party actually said she was not hurt and the Trooper testified at 
the preliminary hearing that he did not notice any injuries on 
her. Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p. 92 L. 12. The Trooper's 
initial investigation was simply to determine if there was an 
intoxicated pedestrian on the highway. He did determine that the 
complaining party's blood alcohol content was .106. Mr. Allen 
was charged with driving without privileges at the scene, not 
attempted strangulation or any domestic related offense. 
Subsequent to the arrest, law enforcement discovered videos 
in the trunk of Mr. Allen's car. The complaining party was 
confronted with the videos by law enforcement. It was at that 
time that her new version of the events was portrayed to the 
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police. Specifically, she claimed that she was grabbed under the 
chin and that Mr. Allen's hand was against her throat. After 
time to reflect, the complaining party's version of events and 
injuries broadened, now including injuries to her nose, arm, 
elbow, along with her throat, neck, and jaw. 
attached Police Report). 
(See PSI and 
Mr. Allen's version of the events of that night differ 
substantially and are actually more in line with the evidence and 
the descriptions by law enforcement. As described to the police, 
one cannot say that Mr. Allen's version is not credible, while 
the post hoc version of events of the complaining party is 
credible, especially considering her initial statements to the 
police that it was just a verbal argument. Clearly, the 
complaining party's version is the one that has changed. 
Even assuming the complaining party's version of events as 
true, this is not a case where the severity of the crime or the 
method of its accomplishment are so egregious that relief under 
Idaho Code § 19-2604 is inappropriate. This is not a case 
involving a victim who was held down and forcibly choked with two 
hands in a violent stereotypical version of attempted 
strangulation. The entirety of the event was described by the 
complaining party under direct examination that it 1) involved 
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only one hand; 2) she was still able to breath; and 3) she did 
not blackout. Preliminary Hearing Transcript, at p. 47-48. 
The District Court ignored the fact this case involved two 
different versions of events and the circumstances that created 
those different versions. One version involved an intoxicated 
party who initially describes to law enforcement that she had no 
injuries and any dispute was only verbal, and later recants those 
statements. The other version involving Mr. Allen who presented 
to the Court that based on his Alford plea that "there really are 
no facts to share . .. 1 should have been more upfront in my 
dating indiscretion to avoid such a reaction. I do feel bad, and 
wish her the best." PSI., at p. 3. 
Subsequently, Mr. Allen went on to successfully complete two 
and one half years of probation. The complaining party never 
argued against the request to have the charge dismissed, nor did 
the prosecuting attorney object on behalf of the State of Idaho. 
By not addressing these arguments the District Court did not 
reach its decision through an exercise of reason. 
B. The District Court abused its discretion in denying Mr. 
Allen's Motion to Seal. 
Mr. Allen argued that several provisions in Rule 32(i) of 
the Idaho Court Administrative Rules were applicable to his 
Motion to Seal. The Court failed to adequately address these 
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arguments, focusing solely on Mr. Allen's argument of economic 
harm. Failure to apply applicable law and address Mr. Allen's 
argument is an abuse of discretion. As such, this failure of the 
District Court was an abuse of discretion because it 
overemphasized a single factor while failing to address the 
others. 
Idaho trial Courts have the authority to seal case files 
pursuant to Rule 32(i) of the Idaho Court Administrative Rules. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that Rule 32(i) is the 
correct rule for a court to apply in a proceeding on a criminal 
defendant's request to seal records. State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 
869, 871 (2009). Further, Idaho law states that the custodian 
judge of the criminal file is invested with the discretion to 
determine if a person's privacy interest in sealing a case file 
trumps the public's interest. Doe v. State, 153 Idaho 685 (Ct. 
App. 2012; State v. Doe, 2013 WL 1960633 (Ct. App 2013). 
In order to qualify for relief under Rule 32(i) a defendant 
must show that some privacy interest dominates over public 
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disclosure of the file. 3 In addition, the Court must make a 
written finding that: 
1) That the documents or materials contain highly intimate 
facts or statements, the publication of which would be 
highly objectionable to a reasonable person, or 
(2) That the documents or materials contain facts or 
statements that the court finds might be libelous, or 
(3) That the documents or materials contain facts or 
statements, the dissemination or publication of which 
would reasonably result in economic or financial loss 
or harm to a person having an interest in the documents 
or materials, or compromise the security of personnel, 
records or public property of or used by the judicial 
department, or 
(4) That the documents or materials contain facts or 
statements that might threaten or endanger the life or 
safety of individuals, or 
(5) That it is necessary to temporarily seal or redact the 
documents or materials. 
Mr. Allen argued that the Court should have made a finding that 
subsections (1)-(4) are all applicable. The Court failed to 
adequately address these arguments, stating only: 
Mr. Allen's claim of economic harm is NOT so compelling 
as to outweigh the overarching public interest in 
disclosure. .Mr. Allen has not presented this Court 
with any 'exceptional circumstance' that would warrant 
3 Online access to the Idaho Judicial Repository provides 
employers, landlords, neighbors and total strangers with the 
ability to view very detailed and intimate information about a 
person. Although the long term affects of access to this 
information by anyone with an internet connection has not been 
determined, it is an enormous individual privacy concern. 
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the sealing of his criminal records. While he believes 
that his disclosure to prospective employers that he is 
a convicted felon hurts his chances for employment, 
whether or not the court record is sealed has not been 
shown to adversely affect his employment capabilities. 
R. at p. 291. 
In this case, the Court's file contains documents with 
highly intimate facts about, and statements made by, not only Mr. 
Allen and the complaining party, but also about and by other 
persons unrelated to this case whatsoever. R. at p. 22-25, 27. 
The publication and/or disclosure of those facts and statements 
would be highly objectionable to a reasonable person, including 
the other women mentioned in the file. This is true because the 
file contains material of sexually intimate activity, statements, 
and details that neither Mr. Allen, the complaining party, or any 
of the other named persons would want to be available for public 
disclosure. The Court's file and records in this case should be 
sealed from disclosure and public inspection under Rule 32(i) (1). 
In addition, the documents in the Court's file contain 
statements that may be viewed as libelous. Besides identifying 
specific women, the police reports contain general statements 
that it is unknown how many women were involved in the videos 
seized by police. There is also reference that Mr. Allen 
allegedly has a sexually transmitted disease. He denies that is 
true. See Motion for Reconsideration at p. 43. Because of the 
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false nature of these statements, the disclosure of the Court's 
file should be viewed as libelous. The Court's file and records 
should be sealed from public disclosure and public inspection 
under Rule 32 (i) (2) . 
Furthermore, the documents in the Court's file contain 
statements that the publication of which may reasonably result in 
economic or financial loss or harm to Mr. Allen, the complaining 
party, or others. As previously outlined, the documents in this 
file contain highly intimate sexual information. While this 
information may have economic and financial impact on Mr. Allen, 
presently and in the future, the analysis under Rule 32(i) (3) 
does not end there. The complaining party, or any of the other 
women mentioned in the file may reasonably suffer the same type 
of harm because present and future employers have access to the 
information in this Court record. The Court's file and records 
should be sealed from disclosure and public view under Rule 
32 (i) (3). 
Lastly, the documents in the Court's file contain statements 
that may threaten or endanger the life or safety of not only Mr. 
Allen, but others as well. The police reports and search warrant 
minutes in this case contain information of extramarital sexual 
affairs among a number of persons who are not associated in any 
way with this case. The safety of those persons should be a 
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concern. The public disclosure of the Court's file in this case 
may put a number of people at risk to life or physical safety 
because of the highly intimate nature of the information 
contained in the file. The Court's file and records should be 
sealed from public disclosure and inspection under Rule 32(i) (4). 
The Court failed to address three of the four arguments as 
to why the Court file should be sealed pursuant to Rule 32(i) of 
the Idaho Court Administrative Rules. The failure to consider 
not only the arguments, but the Rule itself, is an abuse of 
discretion because the Court did not apply the applicable law, 
nor reach its decision through an exercise of reason. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The District Court abused its discretion in denying Mr. 
Allen's Motion for Reconsideration and his Motion to Seal 
Records. The December 12, 2012 Memorandum Decision of the 
District Court should be overturned on appeal. 
DATED this \~ day of July, 2013. 
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